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DCI SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES FOR FY 1976

PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FORMULATION, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 1

Soviet policies, intentions, and capabilities for the execution of political, security and economic programs, with particular reference to:

- changes in Soviet leadership and the dynamics of and factors affecting Soviet decision making.
- providing early warning of scientific and technical advances which could significantly affect the US national security or national welfare.
- major developments in Soviet military RDT&E of weapon systems, deployment, and order of battle.
- Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, possible Mutual Balanced Force Reduction agreements, and the observance of cease-fire or peace treaty arrangements; Soviet perception of US and Allied negotiating positions and force capabilities with respect to these issues.
- Soviet extension of political influence and military power outside of the USSR.

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

SOVIET POLITICAL DYNAMICS

1. What are the prospects for progress, stagnation, or cooling in bilateral Soviet-US relations?

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Include how the USSR evaluates the US as both adversary and partner, particularly in arms control negotiations, economic relations, and competition in major regions of the world?

2. How are the political alignments and policy priorities of the Soviet hierarchy and key interest groups developing as the USSR undertakes the 25th Party Congress and looks toward a post-Brezhnev era?

Consider what difference the eventual departure of the Politburo seniors might make in Soviet policymaking.

3. What are Soviet objectives and current policy in the following area?

Western and Southern Europe -- with special attention to Portugal. -- *What are the levels of Soviet covert assistance to Communist Parties?*

The Middle East, including attitudes and tactics toward an Arab-Israeli settlement or renewed hostilities; bilateral Soviet dealings with the major regional states; the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean

theaters (Northeast, Southeast and South)

Asia in the post-Vietnam period.

4. In the Sino-Soviet relationship, what are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides --

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conflict, confrontation, accommodation, or continued uneasy stalemate?

5. What is the importance to the Soviets of imported Western technology, and how successful are they in acquiring it?

Particular importance attaches to technology having possible strategic utility.

SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

6. What are Soviet objectives, policies, deployment plans and perceptions relating to strategic weapons and the strategic balance?

Give particular attention to how the Soviets rationalize their strategic weapons programs and what goals they have set for themselves in the area of strategic weaponry vis-a-vis the US -- such as catching up, or attaining some sort of superiority.

7. What doctrine, strategy, and plans do the Soviets have for the command and control and use of strategic nuclear forces, including limited employment of nuclear weapons?

SOVIET MILITARY R&D AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

8. What progress are the Soviets making in early research and development and advanced technologies which could lead to significant qualitative improvements in existing weapons systems, or to the development of weapon systems based on novel technical means?

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9. What progress are the Soviets making toward strategic applications of lasers and beam weapons?

✓ NEW. What are the prospects that Soviet dependency on space systems for support of military and intelligence operations will deter them from interference with similar US satellite systems?

Consider how, and under what circumstances, they might attempt to neutralize any such US systems.

*for
to
Soviet
strategic
objectives
selection*

SOVIET ICBM SYSTEMS

10. What progress are the Soviets making, and what are their objectives, in increasing the countersilo capability of their silo-based ICBM forces?

Give particular attention to the accuracies of the Soviet SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 ICBM systems.

11. What progress are the Soviets making in improving the survivability of their ICBM forces?

Consider whether the Soviets are developing and deploying land-mobile ICBMs, and if so, what progress is being made.

SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS

12. What are Soviet objectives in nuclear weapons technology, and what progress are the Soviets making in this area?

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SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES

13. What are Soviet intentions and progress in the development of long-range cruise missile systems for use against land targets?

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION

14. What is the intended size, role and armament of the Backfire force?

15. What progress have the Soviets made in development of improved tankers, a follow-on heavy bomber, or a stand-off carrier for air-to-surface missiles?

SOVIET NAVAL SYSTEMS

16. What programs and plans do the Soviets have for the development and deployment of ~~follow-on~~ SLBM systems, including modifications to existing systems?

Include any changes made in SSBN operational practices and patrol areas, and command and control capabilities.

17. What progress have the Soviets made in development of ~~follow-on~~ antiship missile systems?

Include the characteristics of the guidance systems.

18. What progress are the Soviets making toward acquisition of an effective capability for trailing submarines, and for detecting and localizing them in the open ocean?

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19. What is the status of Soviet RDT&E, and what progress is being made toward deployment of, and reporting improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean surveillance system?

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SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

20. What progress are the Soviets making in ABM development, and what are their plans for further deployment?

21. What progress are the Soviets making in development and deployment of defenses against bombers and missiles attacking at low altitudes?

SOVIET DEFENSE COSTS

22. What are the costs of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons systems and defense programs?

Include information on how they are financed; how they influence defense planning and overall economic planning and performance; and on how the Soviet weapons research and development and acquisition processes work.

ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

23. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact objectives and positions in arms limitations negotiations?

24. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions with respect to adherence to arms limitations agreements with the United States?

EUROPE: WARSAW PACT - NATO - MBFR

25. What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)?

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including

26. What are the capabilities, ^{and} the strengths and weaknesses, of the Warsaw Pact forces for conducting a war in the central region of Europe without prior reinforcement?

27. What are Warsaw Pact views, plans and doctrine for conducting war in Central Europe, including readiness, mobilization ~~commitment~~ and reinforcement of Pact forces?

28. What are Warsaw Pact capabilities to fight a sustained non-nuclear war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and the operation of the rear services?

29. What are the strengths and weaknesses of non-US NATO forces for war in Europe and the intentions of these forces to react in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact?

EASTERN EUROPE

30. How are political forces in Yugoslavia evolving, from the standpoints of internal cohesion and international alignment in the post-Tito period? What is Soviet policy and activity toward Yugoslavia?

NEW What trends and developments are likely in USSR - Eastern European ~~relationships~~ relationships - greater cohesion, greater autonomy, revolt?

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 2

Developments within and policies, intentions, decision-making processes, and capabilities of the People's Republic of China in key political, military and economic areas which impact on important interests of the United States, its allies, the USSR, the rest of Asia and the more influential underdeveloped countries.

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS:

CHINA: INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

31. What major trends and changes are likely in Chinese foreign and military policies relating to the US and the USSR.

Include Chinese policy towards use of nuclear weapons and its general forces' offensive and defensive postures.

32. What are the internal stresses and alignments within the central leadership and at the key regional levels and how are these likely to affect the main lines of China's foreign policy and its economic and military policies?

Consider how these policies are likely to be changed by the successors to Mao and Chou.

33. Will China maintain its economic development, and to what extent will it rely on the West to support its economy especially in areas related to its Military Industrial complex?

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34. What are China's policies and activities towards maintaining and expanding its influence in the Third World, and do these policies contribute to disorder or stability?

Pay particular attention to those PRC activities detrimental to US interests.

35. What are Peking's objectives towards these four key countries in East Asia; Thailand, Korea, Vietnam and Japan?

36. Will Chinese and Indian relations with respect to the Himalayan States and Pakistan lead towards military confrontation or accommodation?

37. What will be Chinese tactics against and negotiating position on Taiwan?

Also consider Taiwan's policies (particularly military) towards Peking.

CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

38. What progress are the Chinese making towards acquiring nuclear capabilities against the US and the USSR, and what is the status of their nuclear R&D technology?

Emphasize locations and capabilities of delivery vehicles, and the numbers and types of weapons in stockpile.

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 3

Political and military developments and trends (including terrorism) in potentially volatile international situations of strategic concern to the US.

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

THE MIDDLE EAST

25X6

39. What are [redacted] Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward the major issues of a peace settlement?

40. What are Arab [redacted] military capabilities, plans 25X6 and intentions?

41. How are the major inter-Arab bilateral and multilateral relationships evolving?

Consider the implications of the changes in Iranian-Arab relations.

42. What is the possibility for and implications of serious political and economic problems within the key Middle East countries (e.g., [redacted] Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran and Iraq)?

25X6

NEW What are the plans and actions of the Arab states for the ~~use of their~~ political use of petrodollars? 10 -

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SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

43. What indications are there of internal and regional instability in South Asia?

Pay special attention to India, and the roles of Iran and the major powers involved in the area.

44. What is the interplay in Southeast Asia among China, the USSR, and the Communist states of Indochina?

Include the strategies and objectives of the Communist states; North Vietnamese and Chinese support to insurgencies, particularly in Thailand; differences and rivalries among the Communist states; and the reactions of the Southeast Asian countries.

45. What are the prospects for stability in the countries of Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, and for relations with the US?

Include implications for US base rights and intelligence facilities, progress toward regional cooperation, and the impact of changes in national policy.

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25X6

47. What developments -- domestic or international -- are likely to seriously undermine the political or economic stability of either North or South Korea, alter the essential military balance on the peninsula, and increase the possibility of hostilities?

WESTERN EUROPE

48. What international forces are affecting the larger West European states and the Community?

Consider how familiar European policies and European relationships (in Europe, with the USSR, with the Third World and with the US) are being affected by:

- the energy and raw materials problems;
- international monetary and trade relationships;
- the course of detente and East-West relationship generally -- including MBFR and CSCE;
- conflicts of interest and uncertainties in North-South issues -- i.e., between Western Europe as

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part of the industrialized world and the Third World;

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
- North European policies toward Southern Europe
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-- the search for European unity versus nationalistic forces; and

-- problems within the Atlantic Alliance and with the US arising from the above and other factors.

49. What domestic forces are affecting the policies of the larger West European states and the Community?

Include the economic, political and social forces within the European states that are affecting familiar patterns of European relations with the US, policies toward NATO, toward the East, intra-European relations and European policies toward the Third World. This question includes such widespread European domestic phenomena as inflation and its social, economic, and political effects, the narrow political margins of most incumbent governments, generational differences, challenges to governing moderates or conservatives



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from the left or splinter parties (including altered strategies of the West European communist parties) and pressures on the established ~~the growth of trans-national identification among policies from important interest groups in labor, industry, students, intellectuals, and the media.~~

50. What signs of instability are there in Southern Europe?

Address the present and prospective uncertainties in Iberia, Italy, and in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle. These problems differ widely in origin and effects, but they add up to a situation of continuing volatility across the southern tier of Europe, with manifold challenges to US interests.

~~They also present dangers or complications to our other European allies, and opportunities as well as dilemmas to the USSR.~~

Iberia

-- The policies and politics of the AFM, the role of the Portuguese Communists and the other political parties, Portugal's economic problems, and the questions of Angola and the Azores.

-- The policies and politics of establishment and opposition in Spain as the transition nears.

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Italy

-- Prospects for the PCI gaining influence and/or entering the government, the posture ^{and strength} of the center-left parties on this issue, and the implications for NATO and US interests.

Greece-Turkey-Cyprus

-- Domestic and external developments affecting relationships among these states and between them and the US, other NATO states, and the USSR.

LATIN AMERICA

51. What political, economic, and security developments seriously affect important US interests, particularly in major countries?

Include blocs or alignments being formed among Latin American states and indicators of instability of major governments.

52. What are Cuban attitudes and interests regarding the normalization of relations with the US?

53. What will the Panamanian government's attitudes and actions be during the course of negotiations for a new canal

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treaty and, if a treaty is signed, during the ratification process?

Include willingness and/or ability to accept delay or breakoff of negotiations, or delay or rejection of a treaty, and plans for pressure tactics against the US, particularly a resort to violent methods.

TERRORISM

54. What are the composition, intentions, and capabilities of foreign terrorist or extremist groups?

Include their sources of funds and equipment, the possibility of seizure or production and use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nuclear), their impact on government policy and stability in their host countries, and any evidence that Communist or other countries are influencing them, or rendering direct support.

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 4

Policies, intentions and capabilities of foreign states other than the USSR and the PRC to develop nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and delivery systems and to employ them.

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTION

55. What are the objectives, programs and capabilities of countries other than the US, USSR, UK, France and the PRC for developing or acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems?

Include policies and actions of other countries (including nuclear powers) toward assisting the non-nuclear states in acquiring a nuclear capability.

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SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE NO. 5

Major foreign economic developments and trends relevant to US international policy decisions and negotiations, particularly those related to energy, raw materials, food resources, and to international trade arrangements.

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

PROSPECTS FOR INFLATION AND RECOVERY

56. What changes in measures of economic performance are expected for the major non-Communist industrial nations, especially Japan, Germany, Italy, the UK, France and Canada?

Include these governments' domestic and foreign economic policies and the likely effect of these policies on the future performance of these economies and the US economy.

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

57. What are the principal objectives of the major economic powers (especially France, Germany, Japan, the UK, Italy, Canada and Brazil) in the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations?

Include their possible negotiating tradeoffs and the electoral and intra-governmental factors that affect these objectives and tradeoffs. Appraise the consequences of alternative trade agreements to the US foreign trade balance.

ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR OIL EXPORTERS

58. What are the changes in amounts and composition (by location, currency, type of asset and maturity) of the foreign assets of the major oil exporting countries, and what are their policies with respect to placement of surplus funds?

59. What are the policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities of the major petroleum exporters with respect to the production and marketing of oil?

Include the effects on these policies and vulnerabilities of prospects for the development of new energy sources, particularly non-OPEC oil.

POLICIES OF PRODUCERS OF IMPORTANT RAW MATERIALS OTHER THAN PETROLEUM

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60. What changes in production, marketing and pricing policies are the major producers of important raw materials or primary products [redacted] considering either individually or in concert?

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
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FOREIGN DEMAND FOR US AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

61. What is the likely demand (especially by the USSR, China, India, Japan) for imports of wheat, soybeans, rice, corn and cotton?

Consider the capabilities of countries other than the US (especially Canada, Argentina, Australia, Brazil) for supplying these commodities to the world market.

25X6 FOREIGN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES



LAW OF THE SEA

63. What are the negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities of key countries on the form and content of a Law of the Sea treaty?

Give particular attention to issues on which the attitudes and intentions of these countries are likely to be so contentious as to jeopardize prospects for a treaty even minimally acceptable to the United States.

European Community - What are the plans, actions and trends in EC programs affecting US political and economic interests?

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ADDITIONAL KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

NARCOTICS

Foreign

64. Who are the major producers, traffickers, and financiers involved in illicit narcotics?

Include their methods of operation, the location of their production areas, laboratories, storage and transportation facilities, and how and by what routes and timing they move illicit narcotics to the United States.

65. How effective are the anti-narcotics programs of the countries in categories 1 and 2 designated by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as of priority interest to the US Government's international narcotics control programs?*

Include the willingness of these governments to cooperate with and commit resources to US efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their collaborators. Also, identify individuals in the respective governments who protect and facilitate illicit narcotics traffic.

* At present, these two categories include Mexico, Thailand, Burma, Turkey, France, Pakistan, and Colombia; consideration is being given to adding Ecuador, India, and other countries. It should be noted that countries may be added to or dropped from these categories by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as circumstances dictate.

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LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

66. How will the demands of the many LDCs whose economic prospects have been seriously retarded by increased costs of imports (manufactured goods and energy), and whose export earnings (particularly from primary products) have declined, affect US foreign policy objectives?

THIRD WORLD
~~b.~~ What major trends and plans of the Third World countries, with respect to

~~the work of~~ International Organizations

- a. International Policies toward the US, USSR and China
- b. economic disparity with the industrial world
- c. the role of regional major powers (Brazil, Iran, Nigeria, etc)
- d. regional economic associations

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